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  
Abstract—Ransomware attacks have become a global 
incidence, with the primary aim of making monetary gains 
through illicit means. The attack started through e-mails and 
has expanded through spamming and phishing. Ransomware 
encrypts targets’ files and display notifications, requesting for 
payment before the data can be unlocked. Ransom demand is 
usually in form of virtual currency, bitcoin, because it is 
difficult to track. In this paper, we give a brief overview of the 
current trend, challenges, and research progress in the bid to 
finding lasting solutions to the menace of ransomware that 
currently challenge computer and network security, and data 
privacy. 
 
Index Terms—ransomware, cyber security, malware, 
cryptography, data encryption 
I. INTRODUCTION 
ANSOMWARE is a particular class of malwares that  
demands payment in exchange for a stolen 
functionality, mostly data. This class of malware has been 
identified as a major threat to computer and network 
security across the globe [1]. Ransomware installs covertly 
on a victim's device to either mount the cryptoviral extortion 
attack from cryptovirology that holds the victim's data 
hostage, or the cryptovirology leakware attack that threatens 
to publish the victim's data. The real target of this form of 
attack are critical data that are very important to individuals 
and enterprises alike. In fact, the attack has spread to mobile 
devices and mobile malware detection approaches are not so 
effective because of the subtle nature of the malicious 
programs [2]. Therefore, billions of mobile device users are 
susceptible to this attack. 
Most of the ransomware variants depend on file 
encryption as a strategy for extortion. Data stored on 
victim’s device are encrypted while the hacker demands for 
ransom before the files can be decrypted. Ransomware may 
encrypt the Computer's Master File Table (MFT) or entire 
hard drive. It is a denial-of-access attack that prevents 
computer users from accessing files since it is intractable to 
decrypt the files without the decryption key. Ransomware 
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attacks are typically carried out using a Trojan that has a 
payload disguised as a legitimate file. Although advanced 
encryption algorithms are useful for effective protection of 
vital enterprise data, they have become tools for malicious 
attacks in the hand of cyber-criminals. Data protection is, 
therefore, under serious threat as hackers continue to utilize 
enhanced algorithms in ransomware attacks. 
Digital extortion has significantly increased in the last six 
years as the number of online applications and services, and 
smart mobile devices continue to grow exponentially [3]. 
The impact of ransomware has become so tremendous to the 
point that it is now rated as the biggest cyber scam to hit 
businesses [4]. About 80% of ransomware attacks exploit 
vulnerabilities in Flash that firms should have patched. 
Destructive ransomware can spread by itself and hold entire 
networks (i.e. companies) hostage. 
Ransomware attacks are shifting focus from individuals 
to organizations. For instance, the Hollywood Presbyterian 
Medical Center in the United States was attacked in 
February 2016. The health care organization was forced to 
shut down when it was hit by Crypto Ransomware. The 
malicious program encrypted the files on their databases, 
denying medical staff the access to patients’ health records 
[5]. In another occasion, the Methodist Hospital in 
Henderson, Kentucky only managed to recover its patient 
records with backups after surviving a ransomware attack. 
Stolen administrative credentials were used to infect servers 
with ransomware variant dubbed ‘SamSam’. Active 
directory credentials were harvested to break into other 
servers. Overall, nearly half (46%) of firms have 
encountered ransomware attacks: 57% of medium-size 
organizations and; 53% of large organizations. Willingness 
to pay is surprisingly high. IBM found that 20% of 
executives would be prepared to pay over $40,000 each; 
25% would shell out $20,000-$40,000 and; 11% would pay 
$10,000-$20,000. 
Ransomware are now delivered as Word macros and 
PowerShell scripts. ‘Petya’ encrypted hard drive master 
boot record (MBR), as well as files, rendering computers 
completely unusable. The MBR is replaced with the 
malware’s own bootloader so that the ransom note can be 
displayed. The most common method of delivering 
ransomware is the phishing attack and it is not easily 
recoverable. 
According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 
estimated losses of about one billion US dollars ($1 billion) 
was incurred to ransomware attacks in the year 2016. The 
boom recorded by this crime shows that a good number of 
victims eventually pay the ransom to have their data 
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 unlocked. Nearly 40 percent of ransomware victims paid the 
ransom. Three out of four ransomware gangs are willing to 
negotiate prices for decryption. On average, they will give a 
29% discount on the fee initially demanded. Unfortunately, 
traditional preventive and reactive security measures are not 
adequate to handle the effect of ransomware attacks [6]. 
In this paper, we provide a brief overview of the current 
trend, challenges, and research progress in the bid to finding 
lasting solutions to the menace of ransomware that currently 
challenge computer and network security, and data privacy.  
II. COMMON RANSOMWARE VARIANTS 
PC Cyborg was reported as the first ransomware variant 
[4]. The malware attack was launched in December, 1989. 
The victim was deceived with a message display that reads 
that the user license has expired. However, the encryption 
algorithm, symmetric cryptography, was not difficult to 
decrypt [7].  
GpCode [8] also employed the custom symmetric 
encryption but the malware have been improved upon over 
time. The malware was propagated as job advert through 
spam e-mail attachment. In its first attack in May 2005, a 
static key was generated to encrypt all the non-system files. 
The original data was deleted as soon as the encryption is 
completed [9]. However, the key was discovered simply by 
comparing the original data to the encrypted data. A new 
variant of GpCode, called GpCode.AG was discovered in 
June 2016. Its encryption was based on 660-bit RSA public 
key. In June 2008, another variant, GpCode.AK, was 
identified but it was really difficult to crack owing to the 
computational demand.  
Reveton, which is also known as Police Ransomware, is 
commonly spread through pornographic websites [10]. It 
changes the extensions in the windows/system32 folder and 
displays a notification page to its victims [11].  
 Locker Ransomware was identified in 2007 [8]. It does 
not tamper with its victims’ data but only locks their 
devices. Therefore, the data on the device can be transferred 
to another location. Similarly, ColdBrother Ransomware 
locks victims’ mobile devices, takes photographs with 
mobile phone cameras, answers and drops incoming calls, 
and seeks to defraud victims through mobile banking 
applications. 
 Crypto Ransomware encrypts critical files on victims’ 
computer as a payload for extortion. Important files are 
identified and encrypted with ‘hard-to-guess’ keys. The 
choice of encryption keys and coordination of attacks are 
performed by a command and control server [12]. Crypto 
Wall, Tesla Crypt, CTB Locker, and Lock are all variants of 
Crypto Ransomware. 
 CryptoWall was introduced in November 2013. The 
malware is distributed by e-mail as an attached zip file. The 
attachment usually consists of a script file and an exploit kit. 
The malware is injected into explorer.exe and the codes are 
copied into %APPDATA%. This creates a registry value 
run key in the local user registry root path. This is done to 
keep the malware in the victim’s computer even after a 
reboot. The malware also ensure that the system cannot be 
restored to an earlier point by running processes vssadmin 
and dcbedit. Thereafter, a svchost.exe is initiated to encrypt 
files and communicate with the command and control 
server. CryptoWall is one of the popular ransomware 
variants; about 31% of ransomware attacks were traced to 
this malware [13]. However, the encryption of victim’s files 
can be frustrated by the disruption of the connection 
between the target’s computer and the command and control 
server [14].  
In CryptoWall 2.0, multiple propagation of e-mail 
attachments, drive-by download, exploit kits, and malicious 
portable document formats were added. The Onion Router 
(TOR) network was also introduced to guarantee 
anonymous network communication between the target’s 
computer and the command and control server [15]. Some 
randomized data were introduced into CryptoWall 3.0 and 
4.0 to make malware detection more difficult by using 
exploit kits for privilege escalation and the Invisible Internet 
Project (I2P) network for achieve anonymous peer-to-peer 
network. 
 CryptoLocker creates a set of extensions in the 
administrator’s account which enables it to manipulate the 
Internet files [11]. Executable files are created in 
localAppData folder and critical files are detected for 
subsequent encryption. The malware uses the RSA + AES 
algorithm for its encryption process. Its exploit kit is known 
as Angler [16]. On the other hand, CryptoDefense uses a 
low-level cryptographic API that is available in Windows 
operating systems [17]. 
 Curve Tor Bitcoin (CTB) Locker is also distributed 
through exploit kits and e-mail. Here, the command and 
control server is hidden on the Tor network.  What is 
different in CTB Locker is its ability to encrypt victim’s files 
without any connection to the Internet. It uses a combination 
of AES, SHA256, and Curve25519 for its encryption 
process. This malware essentially targets WordPress-based 
websites and it unleashes its terror through a PHP script 
[13].  
 TeslaCrypt, a recent variant of ransomware, exploits 
vulnerable websites using AnglerINuclear exploit kits. It has 
a similar distribution scheme as CryptoWall and all shadow 
copies are deleted using the vssadmin command [12].  
 Locky had its first attack in February 2016. The malware 
program was spread by attaching a Microsoft Office 
document to spam e-mail. The attached document contains a 
macro that downloads the malicious program to the target’s 
computer. Unlike other ransomware variants, Locky extends 
its encryption to external storage devices, all network 
resources, database files, and wallet.dat. The wallet.dat is 
attacked to put the victim under a more intense pressure to 
pay [18]. Extra efforts were made to prevent easy shut down 
of the command and control server. This kind of malware 
employs hardcoded command and control server Internet 
Protocol (IP) addresses [15].  
 Cerber leverages the Dridex spam network to distribute 
the malware via large spam campaigns. The notification of 
attack is voiced through a text-to-speech module [15]. 
Devices that run on Windows 10 Enterprise have been 
attacked with more than 200 cases between December 2016 
and January 2017 [18]. 
 PowerWare was launched through a phishing campaign 
[11]. The operation of the malicious program is similar to 
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 that of Locky but its encryption and hard-coded keys are 
relatively weak. A decryption tool has been published to 
evade ransom.   
 ScareMeNot Ransomware is mainly targeted at Android-
based devices and it has attacked over 30,000 devices [19]. 
TROJ_CRYZIP.A was discovered in 2005 [7]. Files on 
victim’s computer are usually zipped and locked, displaying 
a notification of attack on the screen. It employs an 
asymmetric cryptography, which is stronger than the 
symmetric. On the other hand, KeRanger is targeted at 
Apple operating system. The malware is spread as a Trojan 
on the Transmission Bit Torrent client. As the target installs 
the program software, a binary file that is covertly 
embedded in the package is renamed and stored in the 
library directory as ‘Kernel_process’ for subsequent 
execution of the malicious program. All the files on the 
victim’s computer with a particular file extension are 
encrypted after three days [20]. 
 Seftad launches its attack on Master Boot Record (MBR), 
which contains the executable boot code and partition table 
[9]. Replacing the boot code in the active partition with a 
robust MBR that displays the attack notification prevents 
the target computer from loading its boot code. However, 
payment of ransom can be evaded through reverse 
engineering since the key is not usually hard-coded. 
 LowLevel04, also known as Onion Trojan-Ransom, was 
spread through the Remote Desktop or Terminal Services 
using brute force attack. Files were encrypted using AES 
encryption scheme using the RSA algorithm [21].  
Unlike previous variants, SilentCrypt looks out for 
specific artifacts and private files to know if the code is 
running in an analysis environment or not [22]. DirCrypt 
uses a hybrid approach to encrypt user’s files. The first 1024 
bytes are encrypted using RSA while the rest are encrypted 
using the popular RC4 [17]. 
III. FAILED RANSOMWARE ATTACKS 
A. Hitler Ransomware 
It claims to have encrypted the victim's files, but in fact 
simply deletes file extensions for anything found in certain 
directories. After an hour it crashes the PC and, on reboot, 
deletes the files. The payment demanded is a cash code for 
E25 Euro Vodafone Card. Text found in the code suggests it 
originates in Germany. 
B. Fake Windows 10 Lock Screen 
It tells the user that their license has expired, turns out to 
have the decryption key buried in the code. Researchers 
from Symantec discovered that, while the criminals had 
gone to considerable effort to set up fake tech support 
websites for the scam, the phone number they gave out for 
victims to call was never answered and was soon 
disconnected. On reverse engineering the code, the 
researchers found the decryption key (8716098676542789) 
plainly visible. 
C. ‘PowerWare’ and ‘Bart’ 
They have been cracked by security researchers who 
found flaws in the malware. A team at Palo Alto Networks 
found that PowerWare, while trying to emulate the 
notorious Locky strain, had weak encryption and hard-
coded keys. The company published a decryption tool and 
AVG created a decryptor for Bart due to the malware's poor 
encryption algorithm. 
D. Chimera Ransomware 
The decryption keys of the Chimera ransomware have 
also been published by a rival ransomware gang known as 
Janus. Janus aimed at ensuring there are enough victims 
available for its own malware, dubbed Mischa, which also 
uses some of the Chimera source code. The Chimera 
malware was never especially widespread, being aimed 
mainly at smaller German businesses. But it was notable for 
the threat from its creators that they would publish victims' 
private documents and login credentials if they didn't pay 
up. Security firms had yet to write a decryptor using the 
published keys. Victims are advised to keep the encrypted 
versions of their files safe for later decryption once the 
relevant tool is available. 
IV. CURRENT RESEARCH FINDINGS AND SOLUTIONS 
The vulnerability of targets to Crypto ransomware attacks 
was identified in [23]. Easy recovery of users’ data is 
prevented after being encrypted by exploiting the tools 
available on the victim’s computer. However, victims can 
recover their data after a Crypto ransomware attack by 
changing the name of the system tool that performs shadow 
copies [23]. Information on the features of CryptoLockers 
and the prevention measures against attack can be found in 
[24]. 
Ill-preparedness of organizations offers cyber-criminals 
the ample opportunity of taking advantage of their targets. 
Therefore, businesses must engage relevant resources, 
develop strategic plans toward incidence response, educate 
their staff, and implement policies and regulations that 
guarantee network security, in order to forestall any attempt 
of ransomware invasion [25].  
It has been established that more than 60% of the 
ransomware attacks gain access to victim’s computer 
through drive-by downloads [26]. Currently, drive-by 
downloads are largely controlled by Exploit Kits (EK) and 
the choice of EK is determined by the control panel based 
on the vulnerabilities. A framework was proposed in [26] to 
detect malicious Rig EK communication and protect users’ 
data from being encrypted using a combination of Software 
Defined Networking and Certificate Authority Checker 
(CAC).  
Two countermeasures that free victims of ransomware 
attacks from paying the cyber-criminals were presented in 
[27]. These were achieved by exploiting the weakness of the 
working operation of the malware, and intercepting calls 
made to Microsoft’s Cryptographic API respectively. 
Useful information can be obtained from system API 
packages. These packages can be used to define applications 
without any prior knowledge of user-defined content. R-
PackDroid was developed in [28] to detect Android-based 
ransomware and differentiate it from generic malware using 
machine learning approach. 
On data recovery after ransomware attack incidence, a 
key-backup technique was suggested in [29]. This technique 
will store copies of the encryption keys in a secure 
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 repository. Relevant data security laws that borders on 
ransomware were discussed in [18]. 
Ganorkar and Kandasamy [30] explained the similarities 
and the differences among ransomware variants. Detailed 
knowledge of the working structure of these malwares 
provides enough information that is needed to develop an 
efficient defense scheme against the malicious attacks. 
Important steps to follow in order to avoid ransomware 
attacks are stated in [31]. Ransomware attacks targeted at 
Android devices can be prevented based on the method 
proposed in [32].  
Ransomware attack is more prevalent in the health sector. 
An Electronic Health Record (EHR) system can be secured 
by using a socio-technical method [33]. Computers and 
networks that connect health IT professionals should be 
properly installed and configured to guarantee data security. 
In addition, system defense strategies adopted by health care 
organizations should be user-centric. Continuous monitoring 
of computers and applications must be ensured to promptly 
discover security vulnerabilities before they are being 
exploited by cyber-criminals. Quick recovery plans must be 
in place in case of any attack. Similarly, proactive actions 
must be taken to prevent a repeat of such occurrence. A 
dynamic system, which learns new behavior while under 
attack, was presented in [34]. 
Scaife et al. [35] presented an early-warning detection 
system, called CryptoDrop, which notifies the target of any 
suspicious activity. This system stops any process that 
seems to modify a large amount of data on the target’s 
computer based on certain indicators. Technical solutions 
are not sufficient to handle ransomware attacks because the 
malicious programs exploit social engineering approach. In 
view of this, a honeypot folder can be created and 
monitored to detect changes. Either of Microsoft File Server 
Resource Manager characteristics or EventSentry can be 
chosen to modify the Windows security logs [36].  
The analysis of selected ransomware variants from 
existing ransomware families in Windows and Android 
environments in [37] established that ransomware variants 
exhibit homogeneous characteristics; their main difference 
is in the payloads that are used. The encryption techniques 
employed by these ransomware have significantly 
improved. However, the malicious programs can be detected 
in Windows by keeping close watch on abnormal file 
system and registry activities. On the other, permission 
request by any Android application should be carefully 
screened before it is granted. 
Formal methods were applied in [38] to detect 
ransomware and discover the malicious instruction set in the 
malware’s code. Model checking was used in [39] to screen 
ransomware automatically with the aim of determining 
whether the characteristics of the program have the same 
pattern as that of the malicious programs. 
Online processes can be screened for ransomware when 
suspected to be accessing a large amount of data based on 
the method proposed in [40]. The authors used the 
Kullback-Liebler divergence to detect a process that 
transforms structured input files (i.e. JPEG files) into 
unstructured encrypted files. Similarly, the enhanced 
ransomware prevention system, CloudRPS, in [41] works 
based on abnormal behavior analysis and detection in cloud 
analysis system. It offers more sophisticated attack 
prevention by monitoring the network, file, and server in 
real time. A cloud system is installed to gather and analyze 
different data that originate from user’s device.  
V. PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES 
In order to prevent the user’s data from getting into 
unrecoverable state, users should have an incremental online 
and offline backups of all the important data and images. In 
addition, all the in-built defense mechanisms and detection 
tools should be kept up and running all the time. Exposure 
to threats should be minimized, where possible, with 
common sense, site or IP address blocking and endpoint 
protection. Organizations and individuals should ensure that 
their electronic defense is as impenetrable as possible 
through the 
use of anti-virus, firewalls, IPS, web and mail filtering. 
Policies that prevent penetration should be enforced in 
organizations by ensuring correct system configuration and 
device ‘hardening’. A robust and incremental back-up 
system of business and personal-critical details should be 
implemented.  
Also, personnel must ensure that offline back-ups remain 
offline at all times so they are protected. Backups should be 
tested regularly to guarantee protection.  Organizations 
should put robust policy and processes and a practical 
system of educating users on how to best prevent and deal 
with ransomware attacks in place. Users should enforce a 
general information policy pertaining to what websites are 
Safe for Work (SFW) and Not Safe for Work (NSFW) and 
educate themselves and their team on the risks and the 
methods by which ransomware is activated and attacks are 
carried out from beginning to end. 
Organizations need a system in place that looks for 
anomalous behavior such as rapid encryption or malicious 
non-human activity, to avoid falling prey to rapidly 
evolving and adapting ransomware attacks. The location 
where data is stored on file systems should be known, 
especially in unstructured formats in documents, 
presentations, and spreadsheets. Access to personal data 
should be limited on a need-to-know basis or through role-
based access controls. The goal is to make it difficult for 
attackers to access important data after hacking an ordinary 
user – say, through a phishing email – and launching 
ransomware based on that user’s credentials. Organizations 
should also remove and/or archive outdated or stale personal 
data, further reducing the attack surface. 
Ordinary users whose credentials the ransomware is 
leveraging, do not perform a large-scale scans of crawling a 
file system, navigating through each directory 
and examining file. Therefore, monitoring software, 
particularly based on User Behaviour Analytics (UBA), 
should be able to detect the ransomware and limit the 
number of files that are encrypted. Companies should 
perform should regularly perform back-ups of their file 
systems, especially critical and sensitive data and have 
in place a recovery plan for restoring the data in the case of 
cyber-attacks. 
In order to handling a ransomware attack: systems must 
Proceedings of the World Congress on Engineering and Computer Science 2017 Vol I 
WCECS 2017, October 25-27, 2017, San Francisco, USA
ISBN: 978-988-14047-5-6 
ISSN: 2078-0958 (Print); ISSN: 2078-0966 (Online)
WCECS 2017
 be aggressively patched; back-ups must be created and 
protected; an incidence response plan must be developed; 
and user awareness training must be conducted. Detection 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Ransomware attacks have become a global incidence, 
with the primary aim of making monetary gains through 
illicit means. The attack started through e-mails and has 
expanded through spamming and phishing. Ransomware 
encrypts targets’ files and display notifications, requesting 
for payment before the data can be unlocked. Ransom 
demand is usually in form of virtual currency, bitcoin, 
because it is difficult to track.  
The variants of ransomware has continue to increase 
because of the profitability of the illicit act. However, there 
is a growing effort to curb the spread of this malware. A 
good understanding of the behavior of ransomware will help 
individuals and enterprises to tidy up their vulnerabilities to 
this kind of attack. State-of-the-art research findings, 
proposed solutions, and precautionary measures are 
provided in this study. With the recent spread of 
ransomware attacks on Linux and Mac operating systems, 
the analysis of ransomware on these platforms is needful. 
Kaspersky Lab and Intel have joined forces with Interpol 
and the Dutch National Police to set up a website 
(www.nomoreransom.org) aimed at helping people to avoid 
falling victim to ransomware. The website will host 
decryption keys and tools for those ransomware strains that 
have been cracked by security researchers. 
To avoid data theft and undue extortion of ransomware, 
individuals and organization needs robust network security 
platform. This topic is an emerging field of study in 
academic research. Therefore, more research effort is 
needed to stop the growing trend of ransomware attacks. 
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